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I. NATURE OF CASE
This case arises out of a declaratory action filed by Respondent Statewide Construction,
Inc. ("Statewide") involving the interpretation and application of Idaho Code Section 55-313 to
the relocation of a private roadwayieasement used for vehicular traffic.
Sequoia Pietri, Luke Crawford and Jim and Maggie Crawford, Lonnie and Charlene
King, and Larry Monkarsh (collectively the "Appellants") own express easements granted by
deed across property owned by Statewide Construction, Inc. ("Statewide").

The easement area

described in their respective deeds is a private road that Appellants use to access their property.
Therefore, Appellants are the dominant estate and Statewide is the servient estate to the express
easement. Statewide believes under Idaho Code Section 55-313 it may unilaterally relocate the
easements without Appellants' consent. Contrary to Statewide's position, Idaho Code section
55-313 does not grant a servient estate owner the right to unilaterally relocate an express
easement under the circumstances presented in this case.
11. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The relevant facts in this case are largely undisputed and accurately set forth in the
district court's Memorandum Decision. R. Vol. I, p. 80. Statewide owns a parcel of property in
Valley County consisting of approximately 15.18 acres ("Parcel 1"). Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 26.
Parcel 1 is the servient estate to easements owned by Appellants. Id. Appellants own Parcels 2,
3, 4 and 6, as depicted on the relevant plats. Supp. R. Vol. I, pp. 140-143. Appellants Sequoia
Pietri and Luke Crawford own Parcel 2. Supp. R. Vol. I, pp. 118, 134. Appellants Jim and
Maggie Crawford, parents of Luke Crawford, claim an interest in Parcel 2. Supp. R. Vol. I, p.
118. Appellants Lonnie King and Charlene King own Parcel 3. Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 140.
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Appellant Larry Monkarsh owns Parcel 4. 112. Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 112. Appellant Lonnie King
owns Parcel 6. Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 140.
The Appellants access their parcels via their easements, which is a private road crossing
Statewide's Parcel 1. Supp. R. Vol. I, pp. 112, 116; 118, 121-22; 134, 137-38; 140, 143, 144-45.
This private road provides access from the parcels to Smylie Lane, which is a public county road.
Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 143. The location and dimensions of this private road were determined by
easement, which easement was expressly granted and conveyed to the Appellants via deed.
Supp. R. Vol. I, pp. 116, 121-22, 137-38, 144-45. As part of a proposed residential development,
Statewide wishes to unilaterally move the Appellants' easement and change the location where
the easementlprivate road accesses the county road. R. Vol. I, p. 5. None of the Appellants
consented to a relocation of their easements across Parcel 1. Supp. R. Vol. I, pp., 112, 118, 134,
141.
Statewide filed a Complaint for a declaratory judgment on October 31, 2008, identifying
the Appellants, among others, as defendants in this matter, seeking declaratory relief to
unilaterally relocate the Appellant's easements without their consent. R. Vol. I, p. 1. Appellants
filed their Answer on November 26, 2008. R. Vol. I, p. 26. Statewide filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment on April 16, 2009. Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 23. The Appellants filed their CrossMotion for Summary Judgment on May 26,2009. Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 148. Thereafter the parties
filed their opposing and reply briefs.
After oral argument on the motion and cross-motion for summary judgment, the district
court issued its Memorandum Decision on July 15, 2009, granting Statewide's Motion for
Summary Judgment and denying the Appellant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. R. Vol.
I, p. 80. The district court issued a Judgment and Rule 54(b) Certificate on September 2, 2009.
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R. Vol. I, p. 94. Appellants timely filed their Notice of Appeal on September 23, 2009. R. Vol.
I, p. 94.

111. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Does Idaho Code Section 55-3 13 prohibit a landowner from relocating the existing access
of a private road where such access currently enters onto a public roadway?

B.

Does Idaho Code Section 55-313 permit a servient estate to unilaterally move an
expressly granted easement without consent from the dominant estate owner?

C.

Are there genuine issues of material fact regarding injury to Appellants under Idaho Code
Section 55-313?

D.

Is ldaho Code Section 55-313 unconstitutional?

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment from a declaratory judgment
proceeding, the ldaho Supreme Court employs the same standard as used by the district court
originally ruling on the motion. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Pedersen, 133 Idaho 135, 138,
983 P.2d 208 (1999). Where there are no contested issues of fact below and the issue on appeal
involves the interpretation and application of a legislative act, the interpretation and application
of the statute is question of law over which the Idaho Supreme Court exercises free review.
Driver v. SI Coup., 139 Idaho 423,427, 80 P.3d 1024, 1028 (2003).

V. ARGUMENT
Statewide cannot unilaterally relocate Appellants' existing easement under the authority
of Idaho Code Section 55-313. The right of landowners to relocate a private road traversing their
property requires the satisfaction of a two-pronged analysis. The first requirement is found in the
Statement of Legislative Intent to Idaho Code Section 55-313, which prohibits landowners from
changing a private road's current access if that access enters onto a public road. The second
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requirement is found in the language of Section 55-313 itself which prohibits relocation of a
private road if such relocation injures "any person or persons using or interested in such access."
I.C.

5

55-313. Unless a landowner can satisfy this two-pronged analysis, relocation of the

private roadway is not permitted.
A. Idaho Code section 55-313's Statement of Legislative Intent does not permit Statewide to
relocate Appellants' easement.

Idaho Code section 55-313's Statement of Legislative Intent prohibits Statewide from
relocating the existing easementkoadway because the relocation changes the access of the
easementkoadway which immediately enters onto a public highway system (i.e. a public road).
Idaho Code Section 55-313, reads:
55-313. ELOCATION OF ACCESS. Where, for motor vehicle travel,
any access which is less than a public dedication, has heretofore been or may
hereafter be, constructed across private lands, the person or persons owning or
controlling the private lands shall have the right at their own expense to change
such access to any other part of the private lands, but such change must be made
in such a manner as not to obstruct motor vehicle travel, or to otherwise injure any
person or persons using or interested in such access.
I.C.

5 55-313 (underlining added). The legislature further clarified the underlined language

above through the inclusion of an uncodified Statement of Legislative Intent, which reads:
STATEMENT OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT
H 264
It is the intent of the Legislature that the phrase "any access which is less than a
public dedication" in H 264 shall not include any access that is part of a public
highway system.
Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 129 (quotations and holding in the original).
In order to understand the legislature's reasoning for preparing the Statement of
Legislative Intent, this Court's review of the legislative process leading to approval of section
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55-313 is necessary.

Section 55-313 was presented to the legislature in 1985 as House Bill 264

("HB 264"). Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 126. HB 264 was supported by the agriculture industry, wheat
growers specifically. Id. The purpose of HB 264 was to enable growers to relocate roads across
private lands because "[rlotating sprinklers and erosion are a major factor in the need to change
these access roads." Id. In other words, agriculture production issues necessitated moving
roadways that became eroded due to irrigation practices.

HB 264 was hrther meant to

"...forestall problems with injunctions and neighboring farmerslranchers." Id.
Discussions on HB 264 in the Senate Transportation Committee focused on concerns of
private roadway "access" onto a public highway.' In minutes from the Senate Transportation
Committee on March 7, 1985, Senator Manning stated:
Mr. Manning expressed concern with the possible effects on highway access. He
feels this could allow someone to move access roads without checking with the
highway district or ITD. It could endanger the public or users of the land.
Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 127. To alleviate these concerns, the senators agreed to include the Statement
of Legislative Intent.
While the primary purpose for the Statement of Legislative Intent was to address the
concerns of changing access roads on highways without checking with ITD or a highway district,
the committee minutes reveal a second purpose, which was to specifically inform the courts of
the legislature's intent. The senate commiliee minutes state that the senators chose to include
within HB 264, "a statement of legislative intent should there be a dispute in court," and then
voted to send HB 264 to the floor recommending passage "...and a legislative intent directive."
Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 128 (underlining added). The meeting minutes of the Senate Transportation
1 Idaho Code $49-109-H(4) defines "highway" as, "the entire width between the boundary lines of every way
publicly maintained when any part is open to the use of the public for vehicular travel, with jurisdiction extending to
the adjacent property line, including sidewalks, shoulders, berms and rights-of-way not intended for motorized
traffic. The term "sheet" is interchangeable with highway."
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Committee indicate that: (1) the legislators foresaw litigation problems that Section 55-313
might create if landowners changed the existing access of a private road when such access
entered onto a public road; and (2) the legislature chose to express their intent in "a legislative
intent directive" aimed at informing the courts that Section 55-3 13 does not pennit relocation of
accesses currently abutting a public road.
Although this case comes to this Court on de novo review, it is helpful to analyze the
district court's reasoning and discuss the error in the district court's holding. In its Memorandum
Decision, the district court held:
Based on the clear language of the statute, the purpose of the phrase 'less than a
public dedication' is to prevent easements that have been accepted by highway
districts as public roads from being changed.. .
The Defendants argue that because the easement connects to a public road, it is part
of the public highway system. However, this reading of the intent would make
section 55-313 inapplicable in nearly all cases because virtually every easement that
allows use of motor vehicles eventually connects to the public highway system.
Stated differently,just because a road connects to the public highway system does not
necessarily mean it is 'part of a public highway system' as the Defendants argue.

R. Vol. 1, 87. The district court's holding illustrates its misunderstanding of Appellants'
arguments and analysis of Section 55-313's Statement of Legislative Intent. Appellants' analysis
does not focus on whether a private road will eventually lead to a public road and thus be
considered "part of a public highway system." On the contrary, Appellants' argument on this
issue focuses on a private road's "access" onto a public road. Simply put, the legislature never
intended to grant a landowner the right or authority to move the existing access of private road if
that access enters a public highway.
The fact that legislature did not want landowners to be able to use Section 55-313 to
change a private road's access onto a public road finds support when considering the authority of
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a highway district and ITD (the Idaho Department of Transportation). Neither road authority has
authorityljurisdiction over a private road, but both have statutory authority to control access onto
public highways (a.k.a. public roads). For example, a highway district board of commissioners
"shall have the exclusive general supervisory authority over all public highways, public streets
and public rights-of-way under their jurisdiction, with full power to ... control access to said
public highways, public streets and public rights-of-way." I.C. § 40-1310(8) (emphasis added.).
Likewise, the Idaho Department of Transportation has statutory authority to "[dlesignate state
highways, or parts of them, as controlled-access facilities and regulate, restrict or prohibit
access to those highways.. ." I.C. § 40-3 10(9) (emphasis added).
Thus, the first test to determine whether a landowner may use Section 55-313 to relocate
a private road focuses on whether the relocation involves changing the road's existing access
onto a public highway. If that access is being relocated, the legislature has stated that Section
55-313 cannot be used for that purpose.
In this case, the Statement of Legislative Intent for Idaho Code Section 55-313 prohibits
the actions attempted by Statewide. Contained in the Supplemental Clerk's Record on Appeal,
Supp. R. Vol. 1, 143, is a subdivision plat map depicting Appellants' roadleasement area in
dashed lines. The location of Statewide's road is depicted in solid lines and is identified on the
plat as "Smylie Court." Supp. R. Vol. I, 143. For this Court's convenience, a reduced version of
the plat map is reproduced here as Figure I below.

[Remainder of page intentionally left blank]
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Immediately north of the Appellants' roadleasement and Statewide's new road, is Smylie Lane.
The district court specifically found in its Memorandum Decision that Smylie Lane is a county
road. R. Vol. I, 85. The plat map reveals that, Appellants' private roadleasement area currently
"accesses" this county road. Moreover, this Court need merely examine and compare the
graphical depictions of Appellants' roadwayleasement area to Statewide's relocation area (i.e.
Smylie Court) to see that Statewide is attempting to move the current "access" onto a public
highway to a different location in direct contravention of Idaho Code Section 55-313's Statement
of Legislative Intent.
Based on the discussion above, Appellants ask this Court to find that the application of
Idaho Code Section 55-313 is not applicable given the facts of this case. Statewide is attempting
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to relocate an existing roadway access onto a public road. As such, Appellant's request this
Court to reverse the district court's judgment granting Statewide's relocation of the existing
private road.
B. Statewide may not unilaterally relocate the existing roadway easement because it
eonstitutes an injury to Appellants.
The second question that must be answered when determining whether a land owner may
relocate a private road under Section 55-313 is to determine whether such relocation injures "any
person or persons using or interested in such access" I.C. § 55-313. Unless the landowner can
relocate the private road without causing injury, relocation of the private roadway is not
permitted.

1. Idaho Code Section 55-313 cannot be interpreted to permit a servient estate
owner to unilaterally relocate an express easement without consent of the dominant
estate owner because relocation without consent is aperse injury.
In its Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Statewide alleges that it is "entitled
to relocate the roadway easement without consent of the dominant estate owners under

9 55-

3 13." R. Vol. I, 50. Appellants argue that since the private roadway including its dimensions and
location, were established through an easement "expressly" granted in their deeds, the easement
may not be relocated unless both dominant and servient estate owners agree.
An express easement, being an interest in real property, may only be created by a written
instrument. Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, 707-708, 152 P.3d 575,

578 - 579 (2007) citing Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770,773, 554 P.2d 948,951 (1976) (citing I.C.

5 9-503). An easement is a recognized interest and right in real property. Sun Valley Land

&

Minerals, Inc. v. Hawkes, 138 Idaho 531, 547, 66 P.3d 798, 802 (2003). Although an easement
is a property right that is less than fee, this Court has recognized that an easement owner's
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property right is so important that the taking of an easement by the government is subject to the
same constitutional safeguards for requiring that the taking be made for a public purpose and that
the owner must be paid just compensation. In Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286, 328 P.2d 397
(1958), this Court held that, "[aln easement is an interest in land for which the owner is entitled
to compensation, as much so as if the land to which the easement is appurtenant were taken.. ."

Id. at 90, 328 P.2d at 401.
The issue of whether a servient estate owner may unilaterally change the location or
dimensions of an express easement has not been decided by this Court. However, it is
Appellant's position on appeal that where a private roadway is created through an express grant
of an easement, once the easement is established, neither party may unilaterally change the
location or dimensions of the express easement. To this end, Appellants ask this Court to
consider and adopt the rationale of the Arizona Supreme Court in Stamatis v. Johnson, which
discussed the general rule of easements:
The general and almost universal rule with reference to change in the location of an
easement after the location has once been definitely established, regardless of whether
it has been acquired by grant or by prescription, is laid down as follows in 17
Am.Jur., Easements, Sec. 87: 'The general rule is that the location of an easement
once selected cannot be changed by either the landowner or the easement owner
without the other's consent. The reason for this rule is that treating the location as
variable would incite litigation and depreciate the value and discourage the
improvement of the land upon which the easement is charged. Accordingly, a definite
location of an easement determines and limits the right of the grantee so that he
cannot again exercise a choice. Similarly, a definite location binds the grantor so that
he has no right either to hinder the grantee in the exercise of his right or to compel
him to accept another location although the latter location may be equally convenient
with the right or privilege originally granted.. . .

Stamatis v. Johnson, 71 Ariz. 134, 136-137, 224 P.2d 201, 202 - 203 (Ariz.1950); See also
MacMeekin v. Low Income Housing Institute, Inc., 45 P.3d 570, 575 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)
(recognizing that the rule that both parties must consent to relocation of an easement is the
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traditional common law rule, which is followed by a majority of jurisdictions in the United
States); See also Restatement Third Property, Servitudes 5 4.8 (2002) (a servient estate owner is
permitted to make reasonable changes to the location or dimensions of an easement except where
the location and dimensions are created by instrument).
The rule of law discussed in Stamatis is in accord with Idaho case law and Idaho statutes.
For example, in Villager Condominium Ass 'n v. Idaho Power Co., 121 Idaho 986, 829 P.2d 1335
(1992), Idaho Power obtained an express easement to install power lines supplying power to the
Villager Condominiums. Id. at 987, 829 P.2d at 1336. The power lines and transformers were to
he placed underground per the language in the agreement granting the easement. Id. After the
condominiums were built out, Idaho Power "relocated" the transformers above ground and
placed them on cement pads. Id. at 988, 829 P.2d at 1337. This Court held in Villager that
Idaho Power did not have the right to "expand" the easement (i.e. change the physical location of
the easement) by relocating the transfonners above ground. Id. Although Idaho Power was the
dominant estate owner, this Court recognized that the unilateral relocation of an express
easement is impermissible. The same result should apply where a servient estate holder attempts
to move the location of an express easement.
Moreover, the rule of law discussed in Stamatis is also in accord with other Idaho
Statutes. Interestingly, at oral argument on the cross motions for summary judgment, Statewide
erroneously argued that the right of a servient estate owner to relocate an easement without
consent of the dominant estate had been "established in Idaho long ago." (Tr. Pg. 12, 11. 12-25
through pg. 13,ll. 1-4). In support of this proposition, Statewide cited to Idaho Code Section 421207 which permits a landowner to relocate a ditch. Idaho Code Section 42-1207 reads in
pertinent part:
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Where any ditch, canal, lateral or drain or buried irrigation conduit has heretofore
been, or may hereafter be, constructed across or beneath the lands of another, the
person or persons owning or controlling said land shall have the right at their own
expense to change said ditch, canal, lateral or drain or buried irrigation conduit to any
other part of said land, hut such change must be made in such a manner as not to
impede the flow of the water therein, or to otherwise iniure any person or persons
using or interested in such ditch, canal. lateral or drain or buried irri~ationconduit.
Any increased operation and maintenance shall he the responsibility of the landowner
who makes the change.

The written permission of the owner of a ditch, canal, lateral, drain or buried irrigation
conduit must first be obtained before it is changed or placed in buried pipe by the
landowner.
I.C.

5 42-1207 (underlining added). The underlined language in Section 42-1207 is strikingly

similar to Section 55-313's language that the roadway "change must be made in such a manner
as not to obstruct motor vehicle travel, or to otherwise injure any person or persons using or
interested in such access."

I.C.

5

55-313. However, Section 42-1207 contains additional

language that is in accord with the general rule of easements discussed in Stamatis that does not
support Statewide's position. Section 42-1207 requires that before a landowner changes the
location or buries the ditch of another, "[tlhe written permission of the owner of a ditch, canal,
lateral, drain or buried irrigation conduit must first be obtained before it is changed or placed in
buried pipe by the landowner." I.C.

5 42-1207 (underlining added). The Idaho legislature most

likely recognized that ditch rights for the transportation of water involved quite often, if not
always, some form of easement by express grant, implication or necessity and chose to ensure
that dominant estate owners' property rights would he preserved,
Lastly, this Court's discussion in Turner v. Colds Springs Canyon, L.P., 143 Idaho 227,
141 P.3d 1096 (2006) indicates this Conrt likely agrees with the general law of easements
discussed in Stamatis, supra. In Turner this Court discussed in dicta, that when an express
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easement is granted in a deed of conveyance, absent language within the deed granting the
servient estate holder the right to relocate the easement, the easement cannot be unilaterally
relocated by the servient estate holder. 143 Idaho 227, 229, 141 P.3d 1096, 1098 (2006).
The plaintiffs in Turner filed a declaratory judgment action to establish a permanent
easement. Id. at 229, 141 P.3d at 1098. The district court found evidence of an express
easement, a finding this Court affirmed. Id. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the deed at
issue allowed them to relocate the easement. Id. The deed at issue in Turner included a
statement, in relation to an express easement, that the easement "may be modified and relocated
as the [previous owner of the servient estate] may desire in accordance with her own personal
reasons or any prospective plan for development." Id. The Turner Court recognized, however,
the previous owner no longer owned the servient estate and the right to relocate the easement
was granted only to the previous owner. Id. The Turner Court also held that the lower court:
"did not err in creating a permanent, unmovable easement...". Id. As a result, this Court held
that the plaintiffs, the current servient estate owners, had no right to relocate the easement
because the express easement provided no such authority, nor did it express any intent that the
right to relocate the easement extended to any party other than the initial owner of the servient
estate. Id.
In this case, there is no dispute that the Appellants own the dominant estates and hold an
express easement that was conveyed in their respective deeds for ingress and egress to their
respective parcels. Additionally, there is no dispute that the private roadway at issue in this case
is that express easement area described in Appellants' deeds. Appellants are the persons using or
interested in the access as described in Section 55-313. Therefore a determination whether
Appellants have suffered some "injury" under the statute is paramount.
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Idaho Code Section 55-3 13 expressly prohibits relocation by the landowner by requiring
that such, "change must be made in such a manner as not to obstruct motor vehicle travel, or to
otherwise injure any person or persons using or interested in such access." LC.

3 55-313.

The

term "injury" as used in Section 55-3 13 must he determined on a case by case basis because each
case will have unique facts giving rise to an "injury." This Court may question whether there is
an "injury" in this case because the purpose of the old roadwayleasement is not frustrated by the
relocation to the new roadway.
The district court alluded to that line of reasoning when it discussed the issue of injury to
the dominant estate owners in terms of whether the new road was being moved a couple miles
away versus a couple hundred feet. See. (Tr. Pg. 34, 11. 6-16). However, the issue of "injury"
goes beyond the purpose for which the original roadway was built when the facts involve the
creation of the roadway through an express grant of easement. Based on the legal analysis
above, once an easement is established through an express grant, neither the servient estate nor
dominant estate may move the easement absent the consent of the other party. Therefore, where
Statewide has failed to obtain consent of the Appellants to move the roadwayleasement in
question, the unilateral relocation of the easement is a per se injury under the statute because
Appellants' established property rights, that is, their right to give consent to changing the
easement location has not been complied with.
When construing a statute, this Court's goal should be to seek a sensible construction that
will avoid an absurd result. State v. Paciovek, 137 Idaho 629, 632, 51 P.3d 443, 446 (Ct. App.
2002). Similar to Idaho Code Section 42-1207's written permission requirement, Idaho Code
Section 55-313 must be interpreted to mean a landowner must obtain approval from persons
using or having an interest in the access when the roadway in question was created by an express

Appellant's Brief - 14

grant of an easement. To hold otherwise would lead to an absurd result because it would trample
on Appellants' property rights and throw the law of easements in this state into question. It is for
this reason and the reasons discussed above that Appellants ask this Court to reverse the district
court's judgment.
2. Statewide's relocation of roadwayleasement for a purely private purpose is an
injury to Appellants because it violates a constitutional protected right.

If Statewide is permitted to use Section 55-313 to unilaterally relocate the original
easement area granted to Appellants, the relocation will have the same affect as vacating
Appellants' express easement. That is, Appellants are forever barred from exercising their right
to ingress and egress over a specific portion of property identified and legally described in their
deeds. The physical taking of private property requires that the taking be made for a public
purpose and that the property owner be paid just compensation.
a. Public versus Private Use.
This Court has held that an easement is a recognized interest and right in real property.
Sun Valley Land & Minerals, Inc. v. Hawkes, 138 Idaho 531,547, 66 P.3d 798,802 (2003). As a
property right, easements are included in the classification of estates and rights in lands which
may be taken for public use. Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286, 290 328 P.2d 397, 401 (1958).
When property is taken, both the Idaho Constitution and United States Constitution require not
only that the taking be for public use, both constitutional protections require the payment of just
compensation. Specifically, the Idaho Constitution requires, "[plrivate property may be taken
for public use, but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by
law, shall be paid therefore." Idaho Const. Art. I,

5

14. Similarly, the just compensation clause

of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be
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deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."
The power of eminent domain generally applies only to the government, but there has
been occasion where this Court has upheld the right of a private entity to exercise the power of
eminent domain. Cohen v. Lavson, 125 Idaho 82, 84, 867 P.2d 956,958 (1993). In the context
of a private party exercising the power of eminent domain, this Court has stated that it ". .. has
never held that private individuals may take property of other private individuals in order to
enhance their purely private enjoyment of their property." Id In other words, identical to the
constitutional mandate placed on government, a private entity may use eminent domain only if it
is for "public use" and not purely for private enjoyment. Public use is defined as a use
"necessary to the complete development of the material resources of the state or the preservation
of the health of the inhabitant." Id. quoting Idaho Const. Art.I, 3 14.
Cohen involved a private condemnation action by lakeside lot owners seeking to
condemn a right-of-way in order to construct seven new houses. This Court found that no public
use existed by reasoning that "[tlhe Cohen group's proposed development would make available
a maximum of seven new houses or condominiums to already-designated private purchasers.
This is not something which is 'necessary to the complete development of the material resources
of the state' as required by the Constitution."
The facts and holding in the Cohen case are directly on point with this case. Statewide
applied for a conditional use permit on May 31,2005 in Valley County to develop a seven (7) lot
subdivision owned by Statewide. Supp. R. Vol. I, 41. The plat map for the subdivision found in
Supp. R. Vol. I, 143, (Figure 1) above shows the location of proposed lots. If successful in
relocatinglvacating Appellant's easement, Statewide would be able to develop three out of the
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seven (7) lots over the vacated easement. Like the lakeside owners in Cohen, Statewide's
unilateral relocation/vacation of Appellants' easement is for the purely private purpose of
creating lots on which to build homes. It cannot be said that the creation of those three building
lots is necessary to the complete development of the material resources of the state as required by
the Constitution.
Appellants' express easement is a property right subject to the protections of the Idaho
and United States Constitutions. Statewide's unilateral relocation of Appellants' easement
without their consent, has the effect of vacating their easement forever barring Appellants from
exercising their right to ingress and egress over that specific portion of property identified and
legally described in their deeds. As such, the vacation of the easement is a taking of Appellants'
private property, which mandates that the taking must be made for a public use. Again, the
creation of lots to build new homes is not a public use. Therefore, Appellants will suffer an
"injury" under Idaho Code Section 55-313 if unilateral relocation is allowed because their
constitutionally protected property rights will be violated if Statewide is allowed to take their
easement for a private purpose.

b. Just Compensation.
The Idaho and United States Constitutions protect the individual's right to the payment
of just compensation for a taking of property. The Idaho Constitution states that "[plrivate
property may be taken for public use, but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the
manner prescribed by law, shall he paid therefore." Idaho Const. Art. I, § 14. Similarly the just
compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no
person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
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Appellants have a protectable property right interest in their express easements.
Statewide's unilateral relocation of their easement without Appellants' consent has the same
effect as vacating their easement which is nothing more than a taking of their easement.
Although Idaho Code Section 55-3 13 provides that the owner of the private land "shall have the
right at their own expense to change such access to any other part of the private lands," the
payment for construction of the new roadway does not meet the definition of payment of just
compensation. The United States Supreme Court has held that "just compensation normally is to
be measured by 'the market value of the property at the time of the taking contemporaneously
paid in money."' Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255, 54 S.Ct. 704, 708, 78 L.Ed. 1236
(1934). Thus, Appellants are entitled to the market value of their easement at the time it was
vacatedltaken.
Appellants have not been compensated for the taking of their easement. Since persons
are entitled to the payment of just compensation for a taking of their property, Statewide's nonpayment ofjust compensation to Appellants is aper se injury under Section 55-313.

C The District Court erred in determining that there was no genuine issue of material fact
with regard to injuries that Appellants will suffer as a result of Statewide's unilateral
movement of the easement.
In addition to the various per se injuries the Appellants will suffer as a result of
Statewide's unilateral relocation of their easement without their consent, the Appellants will
suffer additional injuries, both personally and commercially, as a result of Statewide's unilateral
relocation of their easements. Therefore, there are genuine issues of material fact as to the issue
of injury that the Appellants will suffer as a result of Statewide's unilateral relocation of their
easement, which precludes summary judgment in favor of Statewide.
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A landowner may relocate a private road's access under Section 55-313 if the relocation
will not "otherwise injure any person or persons using or interested in such access." I.C.

5

55-

313. In support of Appellants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellants submitted
affidavits identifying a number of legitimate injuries that they will suffer as a result of
Statewide's unilateral relocation of their easements.
Appellants King, Pietri and Crawford conduct commercial business activities out of or on
their parcels. The existing easemenuroad, as currently configured, provide them access in a safe
and useful configuration for their conlmercial purposes. Supp. R. Vol. I, pp. 118, 134, 140-41.
Statewide's unilateral relocation will create a less direct route to their parcels, which will require
them to drive heavy equipment (often covered with mud, dirt and grime) through a residential
street, and will create safety problems and concerns with residents who will live the area. Id.
Moreover Appellant King has a business relationship with the other Appellants to plow snow
over the existing easement. Id. Relocation of the easement will interfere with Mr. King's direct
business relationships. Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 140-41. Appellant Monkarsh, based on his personal
experience, asserts that Statewide's unilateral relocation of the easement will result in additional
safety issues because the proposed relocation will create increased difficulties in seeing
oncoming traffic for purposes of accessing the public highway to which the easement connects.
Supp. R. Vol. I, p112. All these reasons stated above establish genuine issues of material fact
such that Statewide's motion for summary judgment would not be proper.
In its decision below, the district court found that there was no genuine issue of material
fact as to the issue of injury. R. Vol. I, p. 91. The district court reasoned that the only injury
contemplated by section 55-313 is "a taking or a lessening in value to the dominate estate
holders."

The portion of the statute at issue states that relocation is impermissible if the
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relocation will "otherwise injure any person or persons using or interested in such access." I.C. 3
55-313. This language does not support the district court's conclusion that the only type of
injury contemplated by the statute is a taking or a lessening in value - the statute refers to use or
interests in access in the context of injury. The Appellants have established that their use and
access will be impaired by Statewide's unilateral relocation. The district court, even as the trier
of fact, is obligated to hear and consider evidence as to the extent and value of the injury that the
Appellants will suffer as result of Statewide's unilateral relocation of their easements. As a
result, the district court erred in granting Statewide's Motion for Summary Judgment because the
Appellants have created genuine issues of material fact as to the nature and extent of their
injuries as a result of Statewide's unilateral relocation of their easement. The Appellants are
entitled to present evidence on these issues at trial

D. If this Court determines that Idaho Code Section 55-313 permits Statewide to
unilaterally relocate Appellants' express easement, Idaho Code Section 55-313 is
unconstitutional because Appellants are deprived due process to determine just
compensation for a taking of its property right.
Appellants argue in the alternative that if this Court determines that Idaho Code Section
55-313 may be used by a servient estate owner to relocate an express easement without the
consent of the dominant estate, the statute is unconstitutional because it denies Appellants' due
process rights for determination of payment of just compensation.
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free
review. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998); Fremont-Madison Irr.

Dist. and Mitigation Group v. Idaho Ground Water Appropriators, Inc., 129 Idaho 454, 926 P.2d
1301 (1996). The party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds bears the burden of
establishing that the statute is unconstitutional and "must overcome a strong presumption of
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validity." Olsen v. J A . Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 709, 791 P.2d 1285, 1288 (1990). The
judicial power to declare legislative action invalid upon constitutional grounds is to be exercised
only in clear cases. State ex rel. Brassey v. Hanson, 81 ldaho 403, 406, 342 P.2d 706, 709
(1959).
This Court has held that where a statute grants a party possession of property under an
order for possession prior to final determination of the case, and payment of just compensation,
the statue is unconstitutional. Yellowstone Pipe Line Co. v. Drummond, 77 Idaho 36, 287 P.2d
288. In Yellowstone, a pipeline builder moved for an order of immediate possession of private
land of another authorized under ldaho Code Section 7-717 (1953). The 1953 amended version
of Idaho Code Section 7-717, which applied in Yellowstone, also contained language that
permitted the party seeking to condemn property the ability to take immediate possession upon
the condemning party depositing, "a sum equivalent to twice the amount set forth in the affidavit

of the plaintyj and thereupon title to said lands in fee ...shall vest in the plaintifp Id. at Idaho
41, P.2d at 293. This Court held that Section 7-717 was unconstitutional because it violated land
owners' constitutionally protected right to due process under Idaho Const. Art. I, Q: 13 to
determine the just compensation amount prior to the condemning party taking possession of the
property. Id. at Idaho 44, P.2d at 296. This Court later interpreted the Yellowstone decision to
mean that the ldaho Constitution requires that compensation be paid to the property owner prior
to the taking. Independent School Dist. of Boise City v. C. B. Lauch Const. Co. 78 Idaho 485,
490, 305 P.2d 1077, 1080 (1957).
In this case, if this Court affirms the district court's decision allowing a servient estate
owner to relocatelvacate an express easement, a taking under the Idaho and United States
Constitution has occurred requiring the payment of just compensation. Based on this Court's
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holdings applying the Idaho Constitution, payment of just compensation must be made prior to
the vacationltaking of Appellants' easement. If that is the case, Idaho Code Section 55-313 is no
different than the 1953 amendment to Section 7-717. Idaho Code Section 55-313 permits the
servient estate to vacate an express easement and build a new roadway but with no provision
regarding how just compensation is to be paid. In fact, Section 55-313 has no mechanism
requiring that the servient estate even pay just compensation for the easement it takes.
Therefore, Idaho Code Section 55-313 is unconstitutional because it violates an easement
holder's due process rights.
A court should construe a statue to avoid, if possible, an interpretation rendering the

statute or portions of the statute unconstitutional. See Williams v. Paxton, 98 Idaho 155, 163 fn.
1, 559 P.2d 1123, 1131 fn.l (1976) (stating that statutes should be construed "to avoid
constitutional challenges upon our construction of the statute"). The unconstitutional infirmity
discussed in this section can certainly be avoided if this Court were to hold that a servient estate
owner must obtain consent fiom the dominant estate to move an express easement.
IV. CONCLUSION

Idaho Code Section 55-313's Statement of Legislative Intent prohibits landowners from
relocating an existing private access if that access currently enters onto a public road. Moreover,
Idaho Code Section 55-313 cannot be interpreted to allow a servient estate owner to unilaterally
relocate an easement. Such a result is an impermissible interference with the Appellants'
protected property rights under the general law of easements as well as rights under the State and
Federal constitutions. The moving of an express easement without the dominant estate's
consent, the vacatingltaking of Appellants' existing easement without just compensation and
without a public purpose can all be considered per se injuries under the Section 55-313. Lastly,
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genuine issues of material fact exist whether Appellants have or will suffer injuries that are not
otherwise deemed pev se injuries.
Alternatively, assuming Idaho Code Section 55-313 allows a servient estate owner to
interfere with a dominant estate owner's property right and unilaterally relocate an easement, the
Appellants have established that Idaho Code Section 55-313 is unconstitutional because it
deprives the dominant estate owner of due process to determine just compensation. For this
reason, and the reasons set forth above, Appellants respectfully request this Court to reverse the
district court's decision granting Statewide Const~uction,1nc.s' Motion for Summary Judgment
and with instructions to grant Appellants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
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